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Using purpose-collected survey data from 537 households in 60 diﬀerent villages of the Jhabua dis-
trict of India, this paper investigates the extent to which rural households depend on common-pool
natural resources for their daily livelihood. Previous studies have found that resource dependence—
deﬁned as the fraction of total income derived from common-pool resources—strongly decreases with
income. Our study ﬁnds a more complex relationship. First, for the subsample of households that
use positive amounts of resources, we ﬁnd that dependence follows a U-shaped relationship with
income, declining at ﬁrst but then increasing. Second, we ﬁnd that the probability of being in the
subsample of common-pool resource users follows an inverse U-shaped relationship with income:
the poorest and richest households are less likely to collect resources than those with intermediate
incomes. Resource use by the rich is therefore bimodal: either very high or—for the very richest
households—zero. Third, we ﬁnd that resource dependence increases at all income levels with an
increase in the level of common-pool biomass availability. The combination of these results suggests
that the quality of natural resources matters to a larger share of the rural population than had
been previously believed; common-pool resources contribute a signiﬁcant fraction of the income not
just of the desperately poor, but also of the relatively rich.
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Increased recognition that rural households in developing countries depend signiﬁcantly on
common-pool natural resources for their livelihoods has led to a perception that common-pool
resource stocks in eﬀect serve as a public asset for poor households, substituting for the private as-
sets (land, livestock, farm capital, human capital, ﬁnancial wealth) that they lack. This in turn has
raised the policy question of whether improved natural resource management can form the basis of
poverty alleviation policies. The attempt to answer this question has given rise to a growing liter-
ature on poverty-environment interactions (for reviews, see Reardon and Vosti (1995), Duraiappah
(1998), Horowitz (1998), and Barbier (forthcoming)).
One thread of this literature (recently reviewed by Beck and Nesmith (2001), Vedeld et al.
(2004), and Kuik (2005)), has tried to quantify how dependence on common-pool natural resources
varies with the level of household incomes, where dependence is usually deﬁned as the share of
overall income derived from natural-resource use. The seminal paper in this literature is Jodha
(1986), with important recent contributions by Reddy and Chakravarty (1999), Cavendish (2000),
and Adhikari (2003).
1 A common ﬁnding in this literature is that dependence on resources declines
with income. Based on data from 502 households in 21 Indian villages, Jodha (1986) ﬁnds that
poor rural households derive on average between 9% and 26% of their annual income from common-
property natural resources, while (relatively) rich2 households derive only between 1% and 4% of
their annual income from the commons.3 Reddy and Chakravarty (1999), based on data from 232
households in 12 Himalayan villages, similarly ﬁnd that dependence on resources decreases from
22.78% for the poor to 4.26% for the rich.4 Cavendish (2000), based on data from 197 households
in 29 villages in Zimbabwe, ﬁnds much higher rates of dependency, with poor households deriving
as much as 40% of their incomes from natural resources and the rich deriving about 30%. On the
other hand, Adhikari (2003), based on data from 330 households in 8 “forest user groups” in Nepal,
ﬁnds that dependence increases with income, from 14% for the poor to 22% for the rich.5 All
four studies also examine the relationship between income and the absolute level of resource use,
1Other, much smaller-scale studies include Pasha (1992), Singh, Singh and Singh (1996), Nadkarni (1997), Qureshi
and Kumar (1998), Beck and Ghosh (2000), and Fisher (2004).
2Although we refer to households with incomes at the higher end of the rural income distribution here, and elsewhere
in the paper, as rich, it is important to note that these households are still poor in absolute terms.
3Note that in this paper Jodha also refers to data from a larger study, based on 82 villages, to discuss other aspects
of the relationship between poverty and natural resources.
4Reddy and Chakravarty only report ﬁgures on resource use and total income for rich and poor households. We have
used these ﬁgures to calculate resource dependence.
5Cavendish (2000) and Reddy and Chakravarty (1999) categorize households as being poor or rich on the basis of
the households’ total income. Jodha (1986) deﬁnes poor households as those who are either landless or own less
than 2 hectares of land, and rich households as those with more than 2 hectares of land. Adhikari (2003) classiﬁes
households as either poor, middle wealth, or rich based multiple criteria identiﬁed by villagers as important in
assessing households’ socio-economic position.
1but ﬁnd no consistent trend: Jodha ﬁnds that use, along with dependence, decreases with income,
Reddy and Chakravarty ﬁnd an initial slight increase followed by a decrease, and Cavendish and
Adhikari ﬁnd an increase throughout.
Although these studies establish some empirical regularities about the relationship between nat-
ural resource dependence (or use) and rural-household incomes, they suﬀer from a number of
shortcomings. One is that none of the studies examines how, if at all, the relationship changes
with a change in the stock of natural resources. They therefore shed no light on the important
policy issue of who might gain or lose from potential improvements in, or degradation of, the nat-
ural resource base in rural villages.6 Another shortcoming of the studies is that they examine the
relationship between natural-resource dependence and household incomes using only simple tabu-
lations, without verifying if the reported regularities are statistically signiﬁcant. Most importantly,
the studies provide only conjectures—unsupported by evidence from their data—as to why the
reported regularities obtain. Reddy and Chakravarty merely note that the poor have less land
and conjecture that this explains their higher dependence on forest resources. Cavendish conjec-
tures that the decline in dependence with income may in part be due to cash constraints: poorer
households are less able to purchase food and are therefore forced to collect it from the commons
instead. Jodha, in contrast, provides a fairly detailed discussion of why poor households may be
more dependent on commons, suggesting three speciﬁc reasons: (1) common-pool resources act as
a substitute for the private assets that poor households lack—instead of acquiring fuel and fodder
from private lands, for example, land-poor households can collect these resources from common
lands; (2) poor households have surplus labor that is well suited to resource extraction, an activity
where labor is usually the only input; and (3) returns to extraction from the commons are often
not very high, and are therefore unattractive to the rich.7
Our study, using purpose-collected data from 537 households in 60 Indian villages, is able to
examine the relationship between rural household incomes and natural resources at a greater level
of detail and address these shortcomings. By collecting data on village-level biomass availability,
we are able to examine the impact of changes in biomass on resource use and dependence at
diﬀerent income levels. By using regression analysis, we identify inconsistencies with the results of
simple tabulations that highlight the limited usefulness of the latter. Furthermore, we are able to
bring information on household characteristics to bear to understand why certain trends emerge
6Based on oral accounts of villagers, Jodha claims that the contribution of commons to the income of poor households
increases with an increase in the stock of these resources. He does not support this claim with any data, however.
7Fisher’s (2004) study is exceptional, in that she does report estimates of how various household characteristics
aﬀect dependence on forest income in Malawi. Her results lend support to Jodha’s conjectures, in that she ﬁnds
that dependence (1) decreases with goat ownership, (2) increases with the number of men in the household, and
(3) decreases with the household head’s education. Adhikari (2003) reports estimates of how various household
characteristics aﬀect resource use, but there is no straightforward way of translating these into estimates of how the
characteristics aﬀect resource dependence.
2between resource use, dependence, and income. We thereby focus in particular on the question of
how private holdings of productive assets (land, livestock, farm capital, and human capital) aﬀect
households’ use of the commons, i.e., on whether, as Jodha suggests, common-pool resources serve
as a substitute for the private assets that poor households lack.
A more technical contribution of our paper concerns the measurement of resource dependence. In
existing studies, dependence is measured as the ratio of a household’s income derived from natural
resources in a given year to its total income in that same year.8 The typical high variability of
household incomes, both from year to year and across households, makes this a very noisy measure of
“true” resource dependence, which in particular fails to fully capture diﬀerences between households
that are poor in private assets and households that are not. We would argue that all else equal—
i.e., regardless of what happens in any given year—asset-rich households should be considered less
dependent on natural resources, since their assets serve as an additional buﬀer to potential future
negative income shocks.9 In this paper, we account for private asset holdings by calculating what
we call the household’s permanent income from various sources, deﬁned as the ﬂow of income that
the household can expect to derive from these sources over the long run. For incomes derived
from private assets (land, livestock, farm capital, ﬁnancial capital), we do so by combining current-
year returns on these assets with the assets’ annualized end-of-year value; for incomes derived
from natural resources, wages, home enterprises, and transfers, we simply extrapolate current-year
income. Dependence on natural resources is then deﬁned as the ratio of permanent income from
natural resources to total permanent income.10
Using these deﬁnitions of income and dependence11 we ﬁnd that, for the subsample of households
that in fact collect any resources from the commons (about 75% of all households are in this
subsample), dependence does not necessarily decrease with income. Instead, we ﬁnd evidence of a
U-shaped relationship: dependence declines with income at ﬁrst but then increases.
When we examine which characteristics of rich households in the subsample drive their higher
dependence on resources compared to households with intermediate incomes, we ﬁnd, ﬁrst of all,
that households in the top income quartile simply consume more construction wood. At the same
8Jodha deﬁnes dependence on income from commons as the ratio of income from commons to income from all other
sources excluding the commons. He also uses two alternative measures of dependence on the commons, namely the
proportion of households of a given income class that use common property resources and the extent to which a given
household is dependent on the commons for its employment. Using these other measures, too, Jodha ﬁnds that poor
households are more dependent on commons than the rich.
9Jodha (1986) makes a similar observation by noting that “...the CPRs’ role as a cushion during the crisis situation...is
greater for the poor households, as unlike the rich, they do not have many other adjustment mechanisms.” He does
not account for this diﬀerence between poor and rich in his measure of dependence, however.
10A diﬀerent approach would be to use total household expenditures rather than total income in the denominator
of the dependence measure, since expenditures are typically less variable, and more closely tied to expected lifetime
income. We are unable to use this approach, however, because our expenditure data cover only purchases of natural
resources.
11Hereafter, we omit the qualiﬁer “permanent,” treating it as understood.
3time, they do not meet signiﬁcantly more of their consumption through private provision, i.e.,
collection from trees on their own land, and only part of their higher consumption through higher
market purchases.
As for collection of fodder, dependence on which is found to monotonically increase in income,
here we ﬁnd evidence suggesting that the rich prefer stall-feeding their animals to grazing them.
This in turn may be explained by time constraints, as we ﬁnd that the rich tend to have fewer
children, and to derive a larger share of their income from oﬀ-village, as well as private- and public-
sector jobs. Again, however, we ﬁnd that private provision of fodder diﬀers very little between rich
and poor; the bulk of the higher demand for fodder by the rich is met from the commons.
Confusingly, when we next consider the probability of a household using any common-pool
resources at all, i.e., of it being in the above subsample, we ﬁnd that this follows an inverse
U-shaped relationship with income: the poorest and richest households are less likely to collect
resources than those with intermediate incomes. The combination of these two relationships—
the U-shaped relationship between dependence and income for the subsample of 401 collecting
households, but inversely U-shaped probability of being in that subsample—results in a declining
relationship of dependence with income for the sample as a whole, i.e., for the 537 collecting and
non-collecting households combined.
The very diﬀerent relationship between income and dependence for collecting households and
between income and the probability of collecting at all is explained by a “bifurcation” in the use
of resources by rich households. Rich households tend to either collect nothing at all or to collect
a lot of resources, and both tendencies are stronger than they are for middle-income households.
When we compare the characteristics of rich non-collecting households in our sample to those of
rich collecting households, we ﬁnd that non-collecting households are at the top end of the income
distribution, i.e., are among the “richest of the rich,” with on average 65% higher permanent
incomes than rich collecting households. Some of the diﬀerence is accounted for by higher incomes
from transfers, enterprise, and current-year income from agriculture, in part oﬀset by the of course
lower (by deﬁnition zero) income from resource collection. Most of the diﬀerence, however, is
accounted for by signiﬁcantly higher ownership of land and farm capital.
Although, as noted above, rich collecting households consume signiﬁcantly more construction
wood than do poorer households, consumption of wood drops sharply for the very rich, non-
collecting households. Although we have no data to conﬁrm this, we conjecture that the latter
households substitute away to diﬀerent, purchased construction materials (e.g., bricks).
Both types of households turn out to have similar animal holdings, but although, as noted
above, rich collecting households meet no more of their fodder demand from private provision than
do poorer households, such private provision increases sharply for the very rich, non-collecting
households. The non-collecting rich tend to also be more educated, and (not unrelatedly) to derive
4more income from private- or public-sector jobs than the collecting rich. Lastly, they tend to have
smaller families. All these observations are consistent with Jodha’s conjectures about what factors
drive dependence on resources. The fact that non-collecting rich households have fewer children
suggest that they have less surplus labor to devote to resource collection. The fact that they are
more educated and derive more income from agriculture, enterprise, and relatively high-skill jobs
suggests that they prefer to allocate their time to higher-return activities than extraction from the
commons. And ﬁnally, the non-collecting households’ higher landholdings appear to act to some
extent as a substitute for the commons in terms of private fodder and wood provision.
That said, we ﬁnd that most of rich non-collecting households do spend time grazing their animals
in the village commons, and in that sense do engage in “indirect” collection. Unfortunately, because
we have no reliable way of converting time spent grazing to a monetary value, we have to consider
the relationship between income and this form of indirect resource dependence separately from the
remainder of the analysis.
We again consider ﬁrst the relationship of time spent grazing to income for only the subsample
of households (about 82% of the total) that spend positive amounts of time grazing. Time spent
grazing is found to increase strongly and monotonically with income, but this relationship is ex-
plained entirely by the fact that animal holdings increase with income in the same way within the
subsample. When we next consider the probability of being in the subsample, we ﬁnd that this
probability initially increases with income, but declines at the very highest income levels. This,
too, is explained by a similar pattern for animal holdings in the sample as a whole: at the very
high end of the income distribution, animal ownership drops somewhat.
When we examine more closely the characteristics of rich households in our sample that graze
their animals compared to those that do not, we ﬁnd that non-grazing households are somewhat
richer than grazing ones, despite having lower incomes from agriculture and livestock. The diﬀerence
is more than made up for by these households’ much higher income from non-agricultural sources,
such as home enterprise and private- or public-sector jobs. As with the non-collecting rich, the
non-grazing rich tend to be more educated and to have smaller families. It appears, therefore, that
non-grazing households have less surplus labor and prefer to allocate their time to activities that
have higher returns compared to not just the activity of grazing livestock, but also to agricultural
activities as a whole.
Concerning the question of how changes in biomass aﬀect the dependence relationships, we
ﬁnd that overall resource use and dependence increases with overall biomass availability for all
households, at all levels of income. The same is true also when we consider only the resources of fuel
and construction wood and examine how dependence on these wood resources changes with forest
biomass availability. For the fodder resource, the eﬀect of changes in grass biomass availability is
somewhat more complex, and—perhaps not surprisingly—mediated strongly by households’ animal
5holdings. Overall, households with larger animal holdings, which tend to be the rich, tend to rely
more on grazing and less on stall-feeding fodder in areas with high grass biomass availability.
Summing up, and returning to the policy question that motivates this study, our ﬁndings suggest
that, except in the case of particularly rich households, private assets do not appear to act as an
important substitute for common-pool resources, and the private asset of livestock in fact acts as
a complement. As a result, improvements in the quality of natural resources have the potential of
beneﬁting a large share of the rural population: not just the desperately poor, but also middle-
income households and the relatively rich.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study site and
Section 3 the data collection process. Section 4 discusses the methodology used to estimate cur-
rent household incomes, while Section 5 discusses the methodology used to estimate permanent
income. Both sections also provide some descriptive statistics on these income measures. Section 6
presents our results on resource dependence, Section 7, our results on grazing, and Section 8 oﬀers
conclusions.
2. Site Description
The study site for our project is the Jhabua district in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh.
Jhabua is an upland in western Madhya Pradesh that is spread over 0.68 million hectares. According
to the Human Development report published by the Madhya Pradesh government in 1998, of the
total land area, 54% is classiﬁed as agricultural land, 19% as forest land, and the rest as “degraded”
land.12 Jhabua is one of the poorest districts in the state, with a Human Development Index of only
0.356, the lowest out of 45 districts in the state. Only 26.3% of the men and 11.5% of the women
in the district are literate, the life expectancy of an average person is only 51.5y e a r s ,a n d3 0 .2%
of the district’s rural population and 41.6% of its urban population is classiﬁed as living below
the poverty line. Agriculture is the main occupation of households, with 90.6% of the workforce
employed in this sector (MPHDR 1998). Furthermore, agriculture in the district is predominantly
rainfed. Households in this region usually supplement their incomes through livestock rearing
and with various products from the forests—most notably fuel wood, construction wood, tendu
(Diospyros melonoxylon Roxb.) leaves, and mahua (Madhuca indica) ﬂowers. These characteristics
of the region—its level of poverty, its dependence on agriculture, and its dependence on natural
resources (fodder, construction wood, and other forest products)—make Jhabua a suitable study
site. Moreover, since high dependence on rainfed agriculture, livestock income, and supplementary
resource income characterize the economies of large parts of rural semiarid India, the results of this
study plausibly generalize to areas beyond Jhabua.
12Degraded land, in turn, is made up of fallow land, cultivable wasteland, and land not available for cultivation.
63. Data Collection and Sampling Procedure
Data were collected from 550 households in 60 villages in the district of Jhabua, covering the
period from June 2000 to May 2001. A random sample of households for the survey was generated
through a two-stage sampling design. In the ﬁrst stage, a stratiﬁed random sample of villages was
generated, and in the second stage, a stratiﬁed random sample of households.
3.1. Sample of Villages. The village sample frame was comprised of 89 villages in the district
of Jhabua where the Madhya Pradesh Groundwater Department has since 1973 monitored, and
continues to monitor, the groundwater level thrice-yearly (pre-monsoon, post-monsoon, and winter).
There is little reason to believe that the restricted sample frame leads to sample selection bias: the
89 villages were selected in 1973 simply to ensure that each of the district’s micro drainage basins
would be represented.13 Furthermore, because each of the micro drainage basins is about 100 km2,
the villages in our sample are well dispersed.
From the sample frame of 89 villages, a stratiﬁed sample of 64 villages was selected to maximize
variability in the forest stock. For the latter, we used data from the Madhya Pradesh Forest
Department’s 1998 inventory of all forest “compartments” (the smallest forest management unit of
area) in Jhabua. For each compartment, the inventory gives area and total volume of trees in cubic
meters. Summing the volume over all compartments within a 5 km radius14 from the center of a
village gave us a measure of the total forest biomass available to the village as a whole, which we
then divided by the number of village households. The resulting measure of per-household biomass
was used as the basis for stratiﬁcation. Unfortunately, political unrest in Jhabua at the time of the
survey made it impossible to complete the survey in 4 of the selected villages, leaving 60 villages
in all.
3.2. Sample of Households. Household sample frames were constructed for each of the sample
villages from village land ownership records and from the Madhya Pradesh state government’s
village-level list of households living below the poverty line (BPL). A random sample of households
was selected from three strata—BPL, land-poor (owning less than 3 hectares of land) and land-
rich (owning more than 3 hectares of land), with oversampling of BPL and land-rich households.15
Table 1 shows the actual distribution—determined from the household survey—of land owned
by our ﬁnal sample of 537 households (13 of the initial 550 had to be dropped because of data
13This information was obtained through personal communication with a now retired employee of the Madhya Pradesh
Groundwater Department, S.C. Joshi, a geohydrologist, who was in 1973 involved in the selection of these wells.
14By law, villages within 5 km of any given tract of forest have legal rights to its forest products; villages outside this
radius do not have the same rights.
15Note that we used the size of land holdings for the purpose of stratiﬁcation only and not to deﬁne a household’s
income. As discussed below, we deﬁne income comprehensively to include income in cash and kind from agriculture,
livestock rearing, resource extraction, home enterprises, oﬀ-farm labor, ﬁnancial and transfer transactions.
7problems). Only 7% of the sample households are literally landless, while another 19% cultivate
at most 0.5 hectares. At the other extreme, 13% of the sample households cultivate more than 3
hectares, up to a sample maximum of 39 hectares.
Land Owned (ha.) 0 >0t o0 . 5 >0.5 to 3 >3
No. of households 37(7%) 105(19%) 326(61%) 69(13%)
Table 1. Distribution of land owned by sample households
3.3. Remote-Sensing Data. In addition to the data obtained through the household and the
village survey, we relied on remote-sensing images and tree and grass biomass measures from sample
plots to obtain data on forest and fodder biomass. A total of 42 plots, of mostly 0.1 hectares, were
laid throughout the district in the fall of 2002.16 Care was taken to ensure that the sample plots
covered diﬀerent landscape types found in Jhabua. Tree biomass and grass biomass data was
collected from each of these sample plots and used to estimate the tree, grass, and total biomass in
tones per hectares for the sample plots. At the same time two satellite images for October 26 and
29, 2002, obtain from the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS LISS-III), were used to construct
the Normalized Diﬀerence Vegetation Index (NDVI)17 for the sample plots. Next, the biomass
and NDVI estimates were used to develop regression models that uses the NDVI as a predictor of
biomass, tree, and grass separately (Arroyo-Mora, Sanchez-Azofeifa, Rivard and Calvo 2001) for
three major land classiﬁcations—grass and young tree plantation, mature but leaﬂess trees, and
mature trees with leaves. Finally, these regressions estimates were combined with NDVI estimates
for 1995 and 2000 to estimate tree and grass biomass measures for these years. The total biomass
available to the household was then estimates by summing up the volume of biomass that fell within
a 5 km radius of the center of the village and dividing it by the number of households in the village.
4. Current Household Incomes
To determine the extent to which households in rural Jhabua use common-property natural re-
sources for their livelihood, we calculate the income that each household obtained from seven major
sources, namely (i) agriculture, (ii) livestock rearing, (iii) common-property resource collection, (iv)
household enterprise, (v) wage employment, (vi) ﬁnancial transactions, and (vii) transfers. Income
from each of these sources is calculated as the diﬀerence between total revenue obtained and to-
tal input costs incurred, where these totals include both market transactions and imputed values
1631 plots of the 42 were 0.1 hectares in size, another 5 varied between 0.08 and 1.11 hectares, and in the remaining
6 plots only canopy cover measurements were taken.
17The NDVI is equal to the diﬀerence in near infrared (NIR) and red (R) light reﬂectance divided by the sum of these
reﬂectances, that is, NDVI = (NIR − R)/(NIR + R) and is commonly used to assess or predict vegetation biomass
from remote-sensing data.
8for non-market transactions. For example, the revenue obtained from common-property resource
collection includes imputed values for resources collected but not sold by the household. Similarly,
the input costs incurred for livestock rearing includes imputed values for fodder collected from the
commons and then fed to own livestock. For income sources (i)–(iv), no cost is imputed for a
households’ own labor inputs, however; in this sense, the incomes from these sources are “gross”
incomes.
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4.1. Income Deﬁnitions. Income from Agriculture: Income from agriculture is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the revenue obtained from all crops and crop-residues harvested by the household
and the input costs incurred for crop production. Input costs, in turn, are deﬁned as the sum of
wages paid to hired agricultural labor; costs of fertilizers, manure, pesticides, diesel and electricity
(the latter for diesel and electric water pumps, respectively); costs incurred to maintain farm capital
(e.g., tractors, water pumps, bullocks); rent paid on land rented in; and rent paid for farm capital
rented in. In addition, we include income obtained from bullocks, calculated as the diﬀerence
between revenues from dung produced by the bullocks (which is sold or used by the household for
either manure or fuel), and the cost of labor hired to graze the bullocks as well as that of the fodder
fed to them. We also include income obtained by the household from trees on its private lands,
equal to the revenues from fuel and construction wood, ﬂowers, fruit, and seeds extracted. No input
costs are deducted from these revenues, as the only signiﬁcant input used is the household’s own
labor. Finally, we added any income from the rental out of own farm capital equipment and land.
Income from Livestock Rearing: Income from livestock rearing is calculated for the six main types
of livestock found in Jhabua, namely cows, buﬀalo, goats, sheep, donkeys, and chickens. Revenue
is deﬁned as the sum of the value of such products as oﬀspring, milk, eggs, and dung produced by
the animals, while costs include the cost of labor hired to graze them and the cost of fodder fed to
them. The latter cost includes the imputed value of fodder grown as a crop and not sold, residue
from other crops used as fodder, fodder collected from village commons and not sold, and fodder
bought from the market.
Income from Common-Property Resource Collection: An open-ended question used during the
pre-testing of the household survey determined that households in Jhabua collect seven main re-
sources from village commons: (i) fuel wood, (ii) wood for construction, (iii) fodder, (iv) mahua
ﬂowers, (v) mahua seeds, (vi) tendu leaves, and (vii) dung. For the majority of households, the
income from common-property resource collection is the sum of the revenue obtained from these
seven resources. The ﬁnal survey also asked households to list “other” resources obtained from the
village commons, but only in a few instances did income from such resources exist.
18Were we to subtract imputed own-labor costs from sources (i)–(iv), we would have to add these imputed costs to
source (v), leaving total income unaﬀected.
9Income from Household Enterprise: Income from household enterprise is deﬁned as income from
any non-agricultural enterprise operated by the household.
Income from Wage Employment: The household survey distinguished three categories of wage
employment, namely (i) in-village casual employment oﬀ the household’s own farm, (ii) oﬀ-village
casual employment, and (iii) regular employment in the private or public sector. Income from wage
employment is deﬁned as the sum of cash and in-kind wages received from these three categories
of employment.
Income from Financial Transactions: Households in our sample own a variety of ﬁnancial as-
sets, including deposits at Banks or the Post-oﬃce, deposits with women’s savings groups, and
loans given to relative or friends. They also owe debt to a number of sources—women’s savings
groups, moneylenders, friends, or relatives. During the survey year, households earned interest
income on their deposits and paid out interest on their debts. Net interest income (interest income
earned less interest income paid out) constitutes the household’s current-year income from ﬁnancial
transactions.
Income from Transfers: Lastly, income from transfers is deﬁned as the sum of cash and in-kind
payments received by a household from its family, friends, the state, and any non-governmental
organizations operating in the area.
After calculating these diﬀerent components of total household income, we make them compa-
rable across households by dividing the income obtained by the number of adult-equivalent units
in the household. See Cavendish (1999) for a discussion of this adjustment procedure.
Current Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Income from Agriculture -1,336 81 437 2,099
Income from Livestock Rearing -379 -99 20 21
Income from Resource Collection 317 363 495 991
Fuel Wood 75 135 160 474
Construction Wood 2 16 3 145
Fodder 156 148 259 253
Other Resources 83 64 73 119
Income from Household Enterprise 45 134 133 1,346
Income from Wage Employment 603 1,127 2,125 4,936
Income from Financial Transactions -1,134 -430 -408 -236
Income from Transfers 159 123 163 1,451
Total Current Income -1,725 1,299 2,965 10,607
Table 2. Current Per Capita Household Income in Rs. by Major Sources and
Income Quartiles for Whole Sample
10Current Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Amount of Land Cultivated (ha) 0.35 0.20 0.24 0.35
Value of Land Owned (Rs.) 29,423 14,064 18,276 36,263
Value of Farm Capital (Rs.) 6,981 2,075 2,395 4,755
Value of Livestock (Rs.) 3,127 2,551 2,525 2,651
Asset Disinvestment (Rs.) 68 30 137 -805
Table 3. Asset Holdings Per Capita by Current Income Quartiles for Whole Sample
4.2. Some Statistics on Current Income. Table 2 shows the composition of current income for
the diﬀerent current-income quartiles.
19 The ﬁrst thing to note is the large disparity between the
mean current income of households in the bottom three quartiles and that of households in the top
quartile. The mean household in the lowest quartile lost Rs. 1,725 over the course of the survey
year (June 2000-May 2001), while the mean household in the top quartile earned Rs. 10,607. The
large losses in agricultural, livestock rearing, and ﬁnancial income are explained by the fact that
the survey year was the ﬁfth consecutive drought year in Jhabua.
Current income from agriculture, livestock rearing, resource collection, household enterprise,
wage employment and ﬁnancial transactions20 increases monotonically across income quartiles: for
example, households in the bottom quartile incurred a loss from agriculture, those in the second
quartile made a very small proﬁt, and those in the third and fourth quartile made larger proﬁts.
Income from transfers decreased from ﬁrst to the second quartile but increased from the second to
the fourth quartile.
Surprisingly, households in the bottom quartile are not asset-poor. As shown in Table 3, these
households cultivate as much land as households in the fourth income quartile and more than house-
holds in the second and third income quartiles. Per capita ownership of land of these households
is considerably above that of households in the second and third income quartiles, though below
that of households in the top quartile. Similarly, households in the bottom quartile have more farm
capital and livestock than households in the top three quartiles. Finally, households in the bottom
three income quartiles appear to make asset disinvestments, ﬁnancial as well as physical, to make
up for income losses.21
19In this table, and all tables reported hereafter, quartiles and means within each quartile are calculated after
weighting the observations to account for the oversampling of forest-rich villages, and of landless and land-rich
households within the villages.
20Information on ﬁnancial transactions was the hardest to elicit from households and is likely to be somewhat
incomplete.
21Note that asset disinvestment is not included in a household’s measure of total current income, as this transaction
reﬂects a change in wealth and not income.
11These ﬁndings on asset holdings and asset disinvestment conﬁrm that private holdings signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect the ability of a household to cope with negative income shocks, a fact that needs to
be taken into account when assessing a household’s dependence on common natural resources.
5. Permanent Household Incomes
Dependence on natural resources is most commonly deﬁned in the literature as the ratio of the
income from natural resources in a given year to the household’s total income in that year. This
measure fails, however, to capture diﬀerences between households that are rich in private assets
and households that are not. All else equal, households rich in private assets should be considered
less dependent on natural resources, since their assets serve as an additional buﬀer to potential
future negative income shocks. As noted above, there is in fact evidence of such buﬀering occurring
in the survey year. We therefore account for private asset holdings by calculating what we call
the household’s permanent income from various sources, deﬁned as the ﬂow of income that the
household can expect to derive from these sources over the long run. For incomes derived from
private assets (land, livestock, farm capital, ﬁnancial assets), we do so by combining current-year
returns on these assets with their annualized end-of-year value; for incomes derived from natural
resources, wages, household enterprise, and transfers, we simply extrapolate current-year income.
Dependence on natural resources is then deﬁned as the ratio of permanent income from natural
resources to total permanent income.
5.1. Deﬁnition of Permanent Income. To make our deﬁnitions of permanent income from
private assets explicit, ﬁrst consider the simplest case of ﬁnancial assets. Given an interest rate
of r%—we use 10% throughout the paper, which is the value-weighted average interest rate on
bank deposits and other types of savings reported by all households in the sample22—and given
private ﬁnancial assets worth Rs. At at the beginning of year t, we assume that the long-run ﬂow
of income that the household can expect from these assets is equal to rAt per year. Given this
formulation, one could estimate the household’s permanent ﬁnancial income as r times the value of
total ﬁnancial assets owned by the household at the beginning of the survey year. This, however,
would not make use of information we have from the survey year on the actual return from ﬁnancial
assets in that year. In order to use this information, we instead deﬁne permanent ﬁnancial income
22Sensitivity analysis with a higher interest rate, namely 15%, did not change any of the results reported in the
paper. However, a lower interest rate, 5%, while giving the same qualitative results, resulted in lower signiﬁcance for
some of the regression coeﬃcients reported in the reminder of the paper. The latter result suggests that information
on current income is more noisy compared to that on permanent income.
12as follows:23
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where q is permanent income, It is the return on the assets during the survey year, ∆At is the
net change in asset holdings between t and t +1 ,At+1 is the value of the assets at the end of the
year24 (i.e., at the beginning of the following year), and rAt+1 is the long-run ﬂow of income that
the household can expect to obtain from these assets. Since
(2)
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Note that if It = rAt, i.e., if the return on assets during the survey year happens to equal the
expected return, then q reduces further to simply equal that expected return, rAt.
As for permanent income from physical assets—land, farm capital, and livestock—we have to
take into account that these assets produce income only when combined with labor. Expected
income from these assets over the long run is therefore equal to the sum of the expected return to
the capital itself and that to the household’s own labor. That is, given an economy-wide interest
rate of r%, an economy-wide wage rate of Rs. w, physical capital worth Rs. Kt,a n dLt units of
own labor applied to capital, the long-run ﬂow of income that the households can expect from the
physical asset is equal to rKt + wLt. Again taking into account the returns to physical capital in
the current year, and net changes in asset holdings during the year,25 the permanent income from
physical capital is
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5.2. Relationship between Current and Permanent Income. Table 4 shows that the corre-
lation between current- and permanent-income quartiles is not very high. For example, although
23Note that we are assuming that the household receives its income at the end of the year and therefore we discount
current income as well.
24Given the sensitive nature of the information, our household survey did not require the household to report the
amount of jewelry it owned at the beginning of the year. The survey did ask the household for information on the net
sales of jewelry during the year. Consequently, we have assumed that the value of jewelry owned by the household
at the end of the year is equal to the amount bought minus the amount sold during the year.
25Our household survey did not elicit information on the amount of land bought or sold by the household during the
survey year and therefore we assumed that the amount of land at the beginning of the year was equal to the amount
at the end of the year.
13Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Lowest 25% 0.36 0.22 0.20 0.16
25–50% 0.50 0.28 0.18 0.11
50–75% 0.13 0.39 0.35 0.13
Top 25% 0.01 0.11 0.27 0.60
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 4. Relationship between Current and Permanent Income Quartiles for
Whole Sample
60% of households that fall into the top permanent-income income quartile also fall into the top
current-income quartile, 13%, 11%, and 16% of these households fall into the third, second, and
bottom current-income quartiles, respectively. This indicates that income in one particular year
may not give an accurate picture of the household’s expected long-run income. For this reason,




Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Income from Agriculture 1,515 2,449 3,723 7,959
Income from Livestock Rearing 121 183 220 181
Income from Resource Collection 186 336 524 1,119
Fuel Wood 100 155 208 382
Construction Wood 2 2 40 123
Fodder 23 72 191 529
Other Resources 60 108 85 85
Income from Household Enterprise 51 151 222 1,233
Income from Wage Employment 627 1,473 2,111 4,580
Income from Financial Transactions -178 -169 -295 -40
Income from Transfers 123 160 262 1,352
Total Permanent Income 2,444 4,583 6,768 16,382
Table 5. Permanent Per Capita Household Income in Rs. by Major Sources and
Income Quartiles for Whole Sample
5.3. Descriptive Statistics on Permanent Income. As shown in Table 5, households in the
lowest permanent income quartile earn Rs. 2,444 per capita on average while households in the
top income quartile earn Rs. 16,382. According to the Madhya Pradesh Directorate of Economics
and Statistics, the average per capita income in the state—for both rural and urban households
combined—was Rs. 11,244 in 1999-2000. Although this ﬁgure is not directly comparable to our
measures of per capita permanent income, it does suggest that our sample captures a signiﬁcant
amount of income variability.
26Cavendish (2000) addresses this issue to some extent by examining the relationship between resource dependence
and household income in two separate years—1993-94 and 1996-97. He ﬁnds that the relationship does not change
materially between the two data waves.
14Permanent income from most sources—agriculture, resource collection, household enterprise,
wage employment, and transfers—increases monotonically from the ﬁrst to the fourth income quar-
tile. Income from livestock rearing increases from the ﬁrst to the third quartile and then decreases,
while income from ﬁnancial transactions shows no clear trend.
Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Income from In-Village Casual Labor 137 284 195 342
Income from Oﬀ-Village Casual Labor 436 1,023 1,476 1,306
Income from Private and Public Jobs 53 166 441 2,931
Total Wage Income 627 1,473 2,111 4,580
Table 6. Permanent Per Capita Wage Income in Rs. by Income Quartiles for
Whole Sample
After income from agriculture, income from wage employment is the largest source of income for
households in all four quartiles. For the ﬁrst three quartiles, the wage income mostly comes from
oﬀ-village casual employment. Households in these quartiles earned 70% of their total wage income
from such seasonal migration. In contrast, households in the top quartile earned the largest share
of total labor income (64%) from regular jobs in the private or public sector and only 29% from
oﬀ-village labor. In absolute terms, however, households in the top quartile still earned more from
in-village employment than households in any other quartile and more from oﬀ-village employment
than households in the ﬁrst and second income quartiles.
As shown in Table 7, the main source of transfer incomes for households in all four quartiles was
the state, and almost no income was received from non-governmental organizations. Households in
the top quartile received substantially higher transfer incomes than household in the bottom three
quartiles. Nevertheless, these households are not as dependent on the state as households in the
bottom quartile.
Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Transfer Income from Relatives 21 42 44 239
Transfer Income from Friends 130 2 6 4
Transfer Income from NGOs 2002 7
Transfer Income from State 99 115 217 828
Total Transfer Income 123 160 262 1,352
Table 7. Permanent Per Capita Transfer Income in Rs. by Income Quartiles for
Whole Sample
As for income derived from common-property resource collection—the main focus of this study—
Table 5 shows that the absolute level of such income increased monotonically with income. The
average household in the bottom quartile earned Rs. 186 per capita from natural resources (with
15the majority of this income coming from fuel wood and other resource collection), while the average
household in the top quartile earned Rs. 1,119 per capita (with the majority of this income coming
from fodder and fuel wood collection). Consistent with Cavendish (2000) and Adhikari, Di Falco
and Lovett (2004), use of all resources combined increases with income in our sample, although the
same is not true of all resources considered individually.
Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Fuel Wood 4.4 3.4 2.9 2.8
Construction Wood 0.1 0 0.5 1.0
Fodder 0.9 1.6 2.7 3.6
Other Resources 3.5 2.3 1.3 0.7
All Resources 8.8 7.4 7.5 8.1
Table 8. Dependence on Resources (%) by Income Quartile for Whole Sample
In contrast to the ﬁndings of Jodha (1986), Reddy and Chakravarty (1999) and Cavendish
(2000), dependence on common resources does not decrease with income for our sample of house-
holds. Instead, dependence follows a U-shaped relationship with income, declining at ﬁrst but
then increasing. This relationship holds, regardless of whether one considers the entire sample of
households (last row in Table 8) or only the subsample of households that collect positive amounts
of common resources (last row in Table 9). Among collecting households (401 households in all,
dispersed across all 60 villages in the sample)
27 the poorest derive about 11% of their total income
from resources. Dependence decreases to 9% for households in the second income quartile, and
then increases again to 11% for the third income quartile and to 13% for households in the fourth
quartile.
28
For both the entire sample of households and just the subsample of collecting households, the U-
shaped relationship is explained by a combination of trends in dependence on individual resources.
While increasing use of construction wood and fodder account for the increase in dependence at
higher incomes, decreasing use of other resources (mahua ﬂowers and seeds, tendu leaves, gum, and
dung) accounts for the decrease in dependence at lower incomes. For the whole sample fuel wood
also accounts for the decrease in dependence at lower incomes, while for the sample of households
that collect dependence on fuel wood exhibits a mild U-shaped, or L-shaped, relationship with
income. At the income extremes, high resource dependence of the poorest collecting households
is mostly due to their high dependence on fuel wood (5.6%) and other resources (4.4%), whereas
27Out of our total sample of 537 households, 136 did not collect common property resources, leaving 401 that did.
28If we follow Jodha and deﬁne dependence on natural resources as the ratio of income from natural resources
to income from all other sources excluding natural resources, then dependence for the rich households increases
substantially, strengthening the U-shaped relationship between dependence and income.
16the high resource dependence of the richest households is mostly due to their high dependence on
fodder (5.9%) and again fuel wood (4.6%).
Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Fuel Wood 5.6 4.2 4.1 4.6
Construction Wood 0.1 0.0 0.8 1.7
Fodder 1.1 1.9 3.8 5.9
Other Resources 4.4 2.8 1.8 1.1
All Resources 11.2 9.0 10.5 13.3
Table 9. Dependence on Resources (%) by Income Quartile For Collecting Households
We now turn from simple descriptive statistics to regression estimates of the relationships between
dependence on resources and permanent income for our sample households.
6. Econometric Results
6.1. Use for Collecting Households. We begin by investigating the relationship between re-
source use (rather than dependence) and both income and and biomass availability for the subsam-
ple of households that derive at least some income from common property resources.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lei_res_c | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | -2.02396 1.268615 -1.60 0.116 -4.566321 .518401
lei_tot_sq_c | .1604198 .0797864 2.01 0.049 .0005244 .3203153
rs_bio_c | .1828206 .07217 2.53 0.014 .0381887 .3274525
_cons | 10.5765 5.029754 2.10 0.040 .4966496 20.65635
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 401
R-squared = 0.10
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 10. Level of Resource Income as a Function of Total
Income and Total Biomass for Collecting Households.
6.1.1. All resources combined. Table 10 shows the results of regressing, for this subsample, the
(log of) permanent income per capita from all natural resources combined (lei_res_c)o nt h e
(log of) total permanent income per capita (lei_tot_c), its square (lei_tot_sq_c), and biomass
availability per capita (rs_bio_c).29
The negative (though not signiﬁcant at 5%) coeﬃcient on income and the positive coeﬃcient
on income squared suggest that the relationship between resource income and total income may
be L-, U-, or J-shaped. A plot of the predicted relationship (shown in Figure 1) shows that the
relationship is in fact J-shaped. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient on biomass availability is positive,
29In all regressions reported in this paper, observations have been weighted and standard errors corrected to account
for our survey design, i.e., for the stratiﬁed selection of villages, the oversampling of landless and land-rich households
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Figure 1. Relationship between Income from Resources, Total Income, and Total
Biomass for Collecting Households
indicating that higher biomass availability leads to higher use. Figure 1 illustrates this by plotting
the predicted relationship at two diﬀerent levels of biomass availability—“low,” corresponding to
the 25th percentile of biomass availability in the sample, and “high,” corresponding to the 75th
percentile.
We ﬁnd, therefore, consistent with the simple tabulation results reported in Table 5 and also
with results in some of the existing literature, that resource use mostly increases with income. The
poorest households are not the largest users of common resources.
6.2. Dependence for Collecting Households. We next consider the relationship between de-
pendence on all natural resources and both income and biomass availability, again only for the
subsample of collecting households. Because dependence, our lefthand side variable, is constrained
to lie between 0 and 1, we use a two-sided Tobit regression to estimate this relationship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | -.5378577 .1638286 -3.28 0.002 -.8661776 -.2095379
lei_tot_sq_c | .0318358 .0099209 3.21 0.002 .0119538 .0517178
rs_bio_c | .0235811 .0106013 2.22 0.030 .0023357 .0448265
_cons | 2.34655 .6767354 3.47 0.001 .9903422 3.702758
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | -1.844132 .0905069 -20.38 0.000 -2.025512 -1.662753
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 401
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11. Dependence on Resource Income as a Function of
Total Income and Total Biomass for Collecting Households.
Table 11 shows that the coeﬃcient on income is negative while that on income squared is positive,
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Figure 2. Relationship between Dependence on Resources, Total Income, and To-
tal Biomass for Collecting Households
J-shaped. Figure 2 shows that the relationship is in fact U-shaped and higher for all income levels
at higher levels of biomass availability.30
The regression establishes that the U-shaped relationship between income and dependence sug-
gested by the simple tabulation reported in Table 9 is in fact statistically signiﬁcant. Since this
pattern of resource dependence diﬀers from the common pattern found in the existing literature,
namely that dependence decreases with income, the question arises as to what explains the diﬀer-
ence. To shed light on this question, we now turn to examine the relationship between income and
dependence on individual resources.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | -.3118402 .2676525 -1.17 0.249 -.8482279 .2245475
lei_tot_sq_c | .0174604 .0154571 1.13 0.264 -.0135164 .0484372
rs_for_c | .0242235 .0124373 1.95 0.057 -.0007015 .0491485
_cons | 1.437912 1.155441 1.24 0.219 -.8776445 3.753468
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | -2.22105 .0954046 -23.28 0.000 -2.412245 -2.029855
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 265
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 12. Dependence on Fuel Wood as a Function of Total
Income and Total Biomass for Collecting Households.
6.2.1. Fuel Wood. As reported in Table 12, in the regression of dependence on fuel wood on income
and forest biomass availability per capita (rs_for_c), neither the coeﬃcient on income or income
square is signiﬁcant. Dependence on fuel wood, therefore, is constant in income or fuel wood
collection from the commons increases in proportion with income. Since, as Table 13 indicates,
households meet most of their demand for fuel wood from the commons, consumption of fuel
30The ﬁgure plots predicted actual dependence rather than predicted latent dependence (which might be less than 0
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Figure 3. Relationship between Dependence on Fuel Wood, Total Income, and
Total Biomass for Collecting Households
Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Collection from Commons 206 291 490 977
Sale from Commons 0 0 0 222
Collection from Private Sources 26 59 53 72
Sale from Private Sources 20 35 29 6
Market Purchase 30 11 33 10
Total Consumption 242 326 548 830
Table 13. Collection and Consumption of Fuel Wood by Income Quartile For
Collecting Households.
wood also appears to increase in proportion with income. Fuel wood for our sample of collecting
households is therefore a normal good. These results also indicate that dependence on fuel wood
does not explain the high dependence on resources for poor and rich households which in turn
results in the U-shaped relationship between income and resource dependence. In the regression
the coeﬃcient on timber availability is signiﬁcant and positive. Dependence is therefore higher at
all income levels for households with higher availability of forest biomass.
31
Interestingly, only households in the fourth income quartile sell any fuel wood from the commons,
suggesting that poorer households do not consider collecting fuel wood for the purposes of selling
it a productive use of their time. Also, the fact that households in higher income brackets rely
largely on the commons for fuel wood provision, despite their higher land holdings, indicates that
the private asset of land in this case does not substitute to any signiﬁcant extent for the public
asset of the commons.
31The “low” and “high” biomass levels for which predicted dependence is plotted correspond, respectively, to the
25th and 75th percentile of forest biomass availability in the sample.
20------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | 1.182598 .6726578 1.76 0.084 -.1654383 2.530634
lei_tot_sq_c | -.0622374 .0364469 -1.71 0.093 -.1352786 .0108039
rs_for_c | .0079155 .0075306 1.05 0.298 -.0071763 .0230072
_cons | -5.516836 3.084665 -1.79 0.079 -11.69864 .664971
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | -1.964365 .2520816 -7.79 0.000 -2.469548 -1.459182
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 37
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 14. Dependence on Construction Wood as a Function of
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Figure 4. Relationship between Dependence on Construction Wood, Total Income,
and Total Biomass for Collecting Households
Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
Collection from Commons 67 61 406 1420
Sale from Commons 000 0
Collection from Private Sources 136 1 428 655
Sale from Private Sources 0 0 0 404
Market Purchase 0 14 24 3364
Total Consumption 203 76 858 5035
Table 15. Collection and Consumption of Construction Wood by Income Quartile
For Collecting Households
6.2.2. Construction Wood. Only 37 households in our sample collect construction wood from the
commons. This likely explains in part the low signiﬁcance of the income and biomass coeﬃcients
in the regression results for dependence on construction wood reported in Table 14. Figure 4 shows
that the income coeﬃcients (which are both signiﬁcant only at the 10% level) translate into an in-
verse U-shaped relationship between income and dependence. This is inconsistent with the pattern
suggested by the simple tabulation in Table 9. There, we found that dependence on construction
wood decreases slightly between the ﬁrst and the second income quartiles and then increases. The
discrepancy appears to be driven by two outliers: the two richest households in the sample of 37
21------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | .1066338 .043105 2.47 0.016 .0202494 .1930181
rs_grs_c | 6.831779 3.687696 1.85 0.069 -.5585287 14.22209
xxx_grs_tot | -.7357267 .4049162 -1.82 0.075 -1.547197 .0757436
_cons | -.8144824 .3783037 -2.15 0.036 -1.57262 -.056345
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | -1.679109 .1296953 -12.95 0.000 -1.939024 -1.419194
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | .0840245 .0415964 2.02 0.048 .0006635 .1673854
la_ani_c | -.0789854 .0723033 -1.09 0.279 -.2238844 .0659136
rs_grs_c | 1.176499 5.171452 0.23 0.821 -9.187323 11.54032
xxx_grs_tot | -.0682914 .5832452 -0.12 0.907 -1.237141 1.100558
xxx_grs_ani | -.7256408 .3252903 -2.23 0.030 -1.377537 -.0737444
_cons | -.5591435 .3723844 -1.50 0.139 -1.305419 .1871315
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | -1.720507 .1479463 -11.63 0.000 -2.016998 -1.424016
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 74
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 16. Dependence on Fodder as a Function of Total In-
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Figure 5. Relationship between Dependence on Fodder, Total Income, and Total
Biomass for Collecting Households
collect very little construction wood. If these two sample points are dropped, the predicted rela-
tionship between income and dependence on construction wood becomes monotonically increasing
in income and therefore more consistent with the tabulation result.
Table 15 suggests that the high dependence of the rich on construction wood is driven by their
higher demand. Although much of this higher demand is met through higher market purchases,
a signiﬁcant fraction is met through higher collection from the commons as well and only a small
fraction through higher private provision.
6.2.3. Fodder. Only 74 households in our sample collect any fodder from the commons by hand,
although, as discussed in Section 7, many more graze their animals on the commons. Table 16
reports the regression results for dependence on fodder. In the ﬁrst regression, the coeﬃcients on
22income and total grass biomass availability per capita (rs_grs_c) are both positive, while that
on the interaction term between income and grass biomass (xxx_grs_tot) is negative. Figure 5
plots the predicted relationship between dependence on fodder and income. At low grass biomass
levels,32 dependence on fodder increases sharply with income. However, because of the negative
interaction term, dependence is almost constant in income at high grass biomass levels. Higher
fodder collection by the rich, at least at low biomass levels, therefore appears to explain some of
the upturn in overall resource dependence for the rich.
If the (log of) animal holdings33 (la_ani_c) and an interaction term between it and grass biomass
(xxx_grs_ani) are included in the regression, however, as in the second regression reported in
Table 16, then the coeﬃcients on both the grass biomass term and the interaction term between
income and grass biomass become insigniﬁcant. The negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term
between animal holdings and grass biomass indicates that, regardless of income, households with
larger animal holdings depend less on collected fodder in grass-rich areas. As we show in Section 7,
the latter appears to be explained by the fact that such households switch from collecting fodder
by hand to grazing their animals in the commons.
More puzzling is the still positive (though smaller in magnitude and less signiﬁcant) coeﬃcient on
income in this second regression, which suggests that the higher dependence by the rich on fodder
is only partially explained by their higher animal holdings. To search for a fuller explanation, we
examine other characteristics that might distinguish rich and poor households that collect fodder.
In Tables 17 and 18, poor households are deﬁned as those that fall in the ﬁrst or second income
quartiles for the whole survey sample (i.e., below the median income level), while rich households
fall in the third or fourth income quartiles. Out of the 74 households that collect fodder, 44 are rich
by this deﬁnition, and the remaining 30 are poor. Table 17 conﬁrms, ﬁrst of all, that rich households
collect signiﬁcantly34 more fodder than poor households, even on a per-animal basis: the value of
collection per animal is about Rs. 3,449 for the rich compared to Rs. 861 for the poor. It shows
also, however, that poor households spend more time grazing each animal in village commons than
do the rich households: on average 91 days per animal, per capita, per year, compared to 70 for
the rich.35 It appears, therefore, that rich households prefer to stall-feed their animals as opposed
to grazing them in open pastures. This preference may be explained in part by time constraints,
32Corresponding to the 25th percentile of grass biomass availability in the sample, with high biomass levels corre-
sponding to the 75th percentile.
33Total animal holdings are deﬁned as the (unweighted) sum of bullocks, cows, buﬀalo, donkeys, goats, and sheep
owned by the household.
34In this table, and all tables hereafter that report comparisons of means, superscripts ∗, ∗∗,a n d∗∗∗denote
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The underlying tests for equality of means are corrected for
the survey design.
35 The survey elicited total grazing hours, which for ease of interpretation we divide by eight to obtain grazing days.
In reality, of course, hours grazed per day vary.
23as these rich households have smaller families (see Table 18) as well as higher labor income from
oﬀ-village casual employment and from private- and public-sector jobs.
Poor Households Rich Households
Collection from Commons 861 3449∗∗∗
Collection from Private Sources 1323 1302
Market Purchase 524 1243∗∗
Days Spent Grazing 91 70
Table 17. Fodder Collection Pattern for Rich and Poor Households that Collect Fodder.
Poor Household Rich Household
Income from In-Village Casual Labor 281 159
Income from Oﬀ-Village Casual Labor 772 1651∗∗
Income from Private and Public Jobs 4 1631∗∗
Whether Head Attended School 0.2 0.5∗∗∗
Years of Schooling 4.8 5.8
Adult Equivalent Units Per Animal 2.3 1.8
Table 18. Income and Asset Characteristics of Rich and Poor Households that
Collect Fodder.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_ c | -.423811 .1518375 -2.79 0.007 -.7281001 -.1195219
lei_tot_sq_c | .0234625 .0087537 2.68 0.010 .0059197 .0410053
rs_bio_c | .0017675 .0023925 0.74 0.463 -.0030271 .0065621
_cons | 1.928634 .6559906 2.94 0.005 .6139996 3.243269
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | -2.757584 .1244031 -22.17 0.000 -3.006894 -2.508275
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 303
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 19. Dependence on Other Resources as a Function of
Total Income and Total Biomass for Collecting Households.
6.2.4. Other resources. Resources other than wood and fodder are collected by 303 households in
our sample. The regression results reported in Table 19 and illustrated in Figure 6 indicate that
dependence on income from these other resources does not vary signiﬁcantly with overall (wood plus
grass) biomass availability per capita. This is reasonable in light of the fact that dung availability
is at best indirectly related to grass biomass, and the remaining resources (mahua ﬂowers and
seeds, tendu leaves, and gum) are derived from very speciﬁc trees, which may purposely be left
standing when other trees are cut. The results show also that dependence on other resources
decreases monotonically with income, indicating perhaps that collecting them is a relatively low-
return activity.
To summarize, although the poorest and the richest households are the most dependent on all
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Figure 6. Relationship between Dependence on Other Resources, Total Income,
and Total Biomass for Collecting Households
and income, they are not dependent on the same resources. The poorest households are particu-
larly dependent on fuel wood and other resources, whereas the richest households are particularly
dependent on construction wood and fodder. Factors that appear to underlie this are diﬀerences in
consumption (the rich consume much more construction wood), asset holdings (the rich have more
animals), and time constraints (the rich prefer stall-feeding their animals to grazing them and do
not bother to collect other resources).
6.3. Resource Dependence for All Households. After examining the relationship between
resource dependence and income for only the subsample of households that collect natural resources,
we now turn to examining this relationship for our whole sample. Since 26% of the households in
our sample do not collect any resources, our data are censored. We therefore use Tobit regressions
throughout and begin again by examining resource use rather than dependence.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | 5.579068 2.714163 2.06 0.045 .1397637 11.01837
lei_tot_sq_c | -.3470002 .1648761 -2.10 0.040 -.6774193 -.0165812
rs_bio_c | .3285117 .131142 2.51 0.015 .0656972 .5913262
_cons | -19.04403 11.27612 -1.69 0.097 -41.64188 3.55381
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | 1.270362 .0513204 24.75 0.000 1.167513 1.37321
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 537
Number of uncensored obs = 401
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 20. Use of Resources as a Function of Total Income and
Total Biomass for Whole Sample.
6.3.1. All resources combined. Table 20 shows the results for use of all resources combined, for all
households in the sample. In contrast to the results of the analogous regression for only households
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Figure 7. Relationship between Use, Biomass, and Total Income for Whole Sample
squared is negative. This suggests that the relationship between resource income and total income
may be inversely U-shaped. Figure 7 conﬁrms that this is in fact the case: in contrast to the
generally increasing relationship between use and income for collecting households alone (shown in
Figure 1), there is a signiﬁcant drop in overall resource use at higher income levels when we include
non-collecting households in our sample.36 Resource use does still increase for all income levels in
biomass availability when we consider the sample as a whole.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | -.0321676 .0149504 -2.15 0.036 -.062129 -.0022063
rs_bio_c | .0257892 .0091966 2.80 0.007 .0073587 .0442197
_cons | .3036225 .1283573 2.37 0.022 .0463888 .5608562
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | -1.715643 .0925065 -18.55 0.000 -1.90103 -1.530256
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 537
Number of uncensored obs = 401
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 21. Dependence on Resources as a Function of Total
Income and Total Biomass for the Whole Sample.
Table 21 shows the results for dependence on all resources combined. Note that we omit the
usual income squared term from this regression, because the coeﬃcients on both income and income
squared are found to be insigniﬁcant when we include the income squared term. If only income is
included, the coeﬃcient on it is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that, whereas the relationship
between dependence and income was U-shaped for the subsample of collecting households, it is
monotonically decreasing for the sample of households as a whole. Figure 8 shows the predicted
relationship, as usual for both low and high levels of biomass. Note that the predicted relationship
not only diﬀers from that for the subsample, but also from that suggested by the simple tabulation
36As with all plots of dependence, the ﬁgure plots predicted actual use rather than predicted latent use (which might
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Figure 9. Relationship between Probability of Collection and Total Income for the
Whole Sample.
reported in Table 8. The tabulation suggested that, even for the sample as a whole, the relationship
is U-shaped.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
collect | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | 1.635368 .7677746 2.13 0.038 .0967132 3.174023
lei_tot_sq_c | -.1131493 .044779 -2.53 0.014 -.2028884 -.0234103
_cons | -4.986098 3.323998 -1.50 0.139 -11.64754 1.675343
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 537
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 22. Probability of Collection as a Function of Total In-
come for the Whole Sample.
6.4. Probability of Collection and Income. To understand the reason for both disparities,
we estimate the relationship between income and a binary variable for whether or not a household
chooses to collect any common-pool resources at all, using a Probit regression. As shown in Table 22,
27Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
% Collecting 78 84 74 62
Table 23. Percentage Collecting Resources by Income Quartiles for the Whole Sample.
the probability of collection is found to increase in income but decrease in income squared. Figure 9
shows that the relationship is inversely U-shaped in total income, consistent with the results of a
simple tabulation of the proportion of households that collect resources in each income quartile
(see Table 23). More speciﬁcally, poor households are found to be somewhat less likely to collect
than middle-income households, but rich households are much less likely to collect than either.
Resource use by rich households therefore appears to be bimodal: they tend to either collect
nothing at all or collect a lot of resources, and both tendencies are stronger than they are for
middle-income households. As a result, if we consider only households that collect, then the fact
that the richer of these households collect more resources than those with intermediate incomes
makes the relationship between use and income increasing, and that between dependence and
income U-shaped. If, however, we add in households that do not collect, then the fact that the
richer of these are less likely to collect pulls both the use and dependence curves down at high levels
of income, leading to a inversely U-shaped relationship between use and income and a monotonically
decreasing relationship between dependence and income.
Income (Rs.) No Collection Collection
Current Income from Agriculture 3174 100∗
Income from Agriculture 11117 5949∗
Income from Livestock 212 160
Income from Resources 0 1831∗∗∗
Income from Enterprise 2676 315∗∗
Income from Labor 4525 4614
Income from Financial Transactions 13 -74
Income from Transfers 1968 959
Total Income 20510 13755∗∗
Table 24. Income Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Collect Resources.
Asset Value (Rs.) No Collection Collection
Value of Land Owned 87,432 40,738∗
Value of Farm Capital Owned 14,185 5,081∗
Value of Animals Owned 3,654 3,211
Value of Bullocks 1,260 1,633
Value of Buﬀalo 1,241 713
Value of Cows 628 516
Table 25. Physical Asset Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not
Collect Resources.
28No Collection Collection
Adult Equivalent Units 5.1 5.3
Number of Male Members 2.1 1.8
Number of Female Members 2.1 2.1
Number of Children 0.99 1.5∗∗
Table 26. Household Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not
Collect Resources.
6.5. Diﬀerence between Rich Collectors and Non-Collectors. To better understand why
some rich households choose to collect from the commons and why others do not, we examine a
range of household characteristics that might plausibly drive this decision. Tables 24 through 30
compare the means of various such characteristics between collecting and non-collecting households
in the top income quartile only. Out of 134 such households, living in 40 diﬀerent villages in our
sample, 83 collect resources and 51 do not.
Tables 24 and 25 show how respectively income composition and asset holdings diﬀer between
collecting and non-collecting rich households. Rich non-collecting households are found to be at the
top end of the income distribution, i.e., to be among the “richest of the rich,” with on average 65%
higher permanent incomes than rich collecting households. Some of this diﬀerence is accounted
for by higher incomes from transfers, enterprise, and current-year income from agriculture, in part
oﬀset by the of course lower (by deﬁnition zero) income from resource collection. Most of the
diﬀerence, however, is accounted for by signiﬁcantly higher ownership of land and farm capital
by rich non-collectors. Table 25 shows that the value of land and farm capital owned by rich
non-collectors is more than twice as high as that of rich collectors.
No Collection Collection
Collection from Commons 0 626∗∗∗
Sale from Commons 0 142
Collection from Private Sources 497 106∗
Sale from Private Sources 70 4∗
Market Purchase 43 9∗
Total Consumption 471 594
Table 27. Collection and Consumption of Fuel Wood For Rich Households that
Do and Do Not Collect Resources.
Although, as noted above, rich collecting households consume signiﬁcantly more fuel and con-
struction wood than do poorer households, Tables 27 and 28 show that consumption of both drops
sharply for the very rich, non-collecting households. Although we have no data to conﬁrm this, we
conjecture that the latter households substitute away to diﬀerent, purchased fuels (e.g., kerosene)
and construction materials (e.g., bricks). There is also some evidence that non-collecting house-
holds substitute privately provided fuel wood for wood from common-property forests, although
private provision of construction wood is in fact lower for non-collectors.
29No Collection Collection
Collection from Commons 0 201∗
Sale from Commons 00
Collection from Private Sources 38 204∗
Sale from Private Sources 05 7
Market Purchase 455 509
Total Consumption 493 856
Table 28. Collection and Consumption of Construction Wood For Rich House-
holds that Do and Do Not Collect Resources.
No Collection Collection
Collection from Commons 0 866∗∗∗
Collection from Private Sources 2,971 1,541
Market Purchase 844 653
Days Spent Grazing 33 40
Table 29. Fodder Consumption Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and
Do Not Collect Resources.
Table 25 shows that both groups of households have similar animal holdings. However, although
it was noted above that rich collecting households meet no more of their fodder demand from
private provision than do poorer households, Table 29 shows that such private provision increases
sharply for the very rich, non-collecting households.
No Collection Collection
Income from In-Village Casual Labor 94 500
Income from Oﬀ-Village Casual Labor 999 1,502
Migration (days) 45 59
Income from Private and Public Jobs 3,432 2,612
Whether Head Attended School 0.66 0.58
Years of Schooling 9.2 7.4
Table 30. Labor Income and Schooling Characteristics of Rich Households that
Do and Do Not Collect Resources.
Finally, although Table 24 shows that total labor earnings are more or less the same between
collecting and non-collecting households, Table 30 indicate some diﬀerences in the sources of these
labor earnings. Rich collecting households derive more of their labor earnings from in-village
and oﬀ-village casual employment, which tends to be relatively low-skill, while rich non-collecting
households derive a greater proportion of their earning from regular jobs in the private and the
public sector, which tend to relatively high-skill. Heads of non-collecting households are also more
likely to have attended school and, conditional on attending, to have completed more grades.
All these observations are consistent with Jodha’s conjectures about what factors drive depen-
dence on resources. The fact that non-collecting rich households have fewer children suggest that
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Figure 10. Relationship between Time Spent Grazing, Total Income, and Grass
Biomass for Grazing Households.
and derive more income from agriculture, enterprise, and relatively high-skill jobs suggests that
they prefer to allocate their time to higher-return activities than extraction from the commons.
And ﬁnally, the non-collecting households’ higher landholdings appear to act to some extent as a
substitute for the commons in terms of private fodder and fuel wood provision.
7. Grazing
Thus far, we have considered only common resources that are collected “directly” by the house-
hold, i.e., by hand. Households also gather one resource, fodder, “indirectly,” by letting their
animals graze in common grazing lands. Unfortunately, we have no reliable way of converting time
spent grazing to a monetary value. We therefore have to consider the relationship between income
and this form of indirect resource dependence separately from the remainder of the analysis.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
qa_lbr_lvs_c | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | 6.583845 2.822632 2.33 0.023 .9271644 12.24053
rs_grs_c | 102.4405 24.54518 4.17 0.000 53.25087 151.6302




qa_lbr_lvs_c | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | -.3459569 3.861818 -0.09 0.929 -8.085214 7.3933
la_ani_c | 21.13953 5.083437 4.16 0.000 10.95209 31.32696
rs_grs_c | -222.5988 251.3519 -0.89 0.380 -726.3193 281.1217
xxx_grs_tot | 27.91214 29.50999 0.95 0.348 -31.2272 87.05149
xxx_grs_ani | 74.69409 26.60561 2.81 0.007 21.37526 128.0129
_cons | 31.4914 32.71772 0.96 0.340 -34.07637 97.05918
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 439
R-squared = 0.25
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 31. Time Spent Grazing as a Function of Total Income,






























0 .5 1 1.5 2
Log Animal Holdings
Low Grass Biomass High Grass Biomass
Figure 11. Relationship between Time Spent Grazing, Animal Holdings, and Grass
Biomass for Grazing Households.
7.1. Households that Graze their Animals. Table 31 shows the results of two regression esti-
mates of the relationship between time spent grazing animals (qa_lbr_lvs_c) and income, animal
holdings, and grass biomass availability, for only those households that choose to graze their ani-
mals (439 out of 537 households in our sample). In the ﬁrst regression, time spent grazing animals
is regressed on income and grass biomass availability alone. The coeﬃcients on both are found
to be signiﬁcantly positive, resulting in the predicted relationship shown in Figure 10. The sec-
ond regression adds animal holdings (la_ani_c), and two interaction terms between income and
grass biomass (xxx_grs_tot) and between animal holdings and grass biomass (xxx_grs_ani). In
this regression, the coeﬃcient on income is no longer signiﬁcant, indicating that income in the
ﬁrst regression merely proxies for animal holdings. The coeﬃcient on grass biomass is no longer
signiﬁcant either, but that on the interaction term between animal holdings and grass biomass is
positive and highly signiﬁcant. This indicates, as one would expect, that grass biomass availability
matters to time spent grazing only if a household has positive animal holdings, and then more
so, the more animals the household has. Figure 11 shows the predicted relationship between time
spent grazing animals and the household’s total animal holdings, for two diﬀerent levels of grass
biomass availability.
It is reasonable to assume that the amount of fodder gathered indirectly through open grazing
increases in the time the household spends on this activity. If so, then this second regression
establishes that the amount of fodder gathered in this way increases in the number of animals for a
given level of grass biomass. This contrast with the second regression of Table 16, which established
that the amount of fodder collected directly by the household decreases in the number of animals
for a given level of grass biomass. The combination of these results implies that, as grass becomes
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Figure 12. Relationship between Time Spent Grazing, Total Income, and Grass
Biomass for Whole Sample.
7.2. All Households. We now turn to examining time spent grazing for the entire sample of
households, rather than just the subsample of households for which this time is strictly positive.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | 6.527703 3.17291 2.06 0.044 .1690482 12.88636
rs_grs_c | 5.129211 30.79534 0.17 0.868 -56.58603 66.84445
_cons | -22.56429 27.62036 -0.82 0.417 -77.91672 32.78814
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | 3.67528 .0597752 61.48 0.000 3.555488 3.795073
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | -1.165728 3.148497 -0.37 0.713 -7.475458 5.144001
la_ani_c | 44.70391 6.820076 6.55 0.000 31.03617 58.37165
rs_grs_c | -140.622 132.935 -1.06 0.295 -407.0297 125.7856
xxx_grs_tot | 8.729299 14.54083 0.60 0.551 -20.41118 37.86978
xxx_grs_ani | 131.7797 31.984 4.12 0.000 67.68235 195.8771
_cons | 22.20892 26.08812 0.85 0.398 -30.07285 74.49069
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/lnsigma | 3.446486 .0490694 70.24 0.000 3.348149 3.544824
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 537
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 32. Time spent Grazing as a Function of Total Income,
Animal Holdings, and Biomass for Whole Sample.
Table 32 and Figures 12 and 13 show that the relationships between time spent grazing animals,
household income, animal holdings, and fodder biomass are largely unchanged when the entire
sample of households is considered. The one notable diﬀerence is that in the ﬁrst regression of
Table 32, the coeﬃcient on grass biomass availability is no longer signiﬁcant. Comparison of
Figures 10 and 12 suggests that there is a parallel shift downwards in the time spent grazing animals
in high-biomass areas relative to low-biomass areas when non-grazing households are added to the
sample. Underlying this is a puzzling tendency (conﬁrmed by a tabulation not reported here) for
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Figure 13. Relationship between Time Spent Grazing, Animal Holdings, and Grass
Biomass for Whole Sample.
As was true for the subsample of households that graze their animals, the coeﬃcient on income
is no longer signiﬁcant in the second regression of Table 31, suggesting again that income in the
ﬁrst regression merely proxies for animal holdings. As in Figure 11, the positive coeﬃcient on the
interaction term between animal holdings and grass biomass in the second regression causes the
curve between time spent grazing and animal holdings to become steeper at the high biomass level.
However, again because non-grazing households live disproportionately in high-biomass areas, in
Figure 13 the high-biomass curve is also shifted downwards relative to low-biomass curve when
compared to Figure 11.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
graze | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | 3.416272 1.322227 2.58 0.012 .7664695 6.066074
lei_tot_sq_c | -.1937691 .0772857 -2.51 0.015 -.3486531 -.0388852
_cons | -14.04421 5.597639 -2.51 0.015 -25.26213 -2.826292
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
graze | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lei_tot_c | 1.171939 1.338588 0.88 0.385 -1.510651 3.854529
lei_tot_sq_c | -.0717602 .079784 -0.90 0.372 -.231651 .0881305
la_ani_c | 6.122887 .5774282 10.60 0.000 4.965695 7.280079
la_ani_sq_c | -2.321883 .3643577 -6.37 0.000 -3.052072 -1.591693
_cons | -5.548326 5.516917 -1.01 0.319 -16.60447 5.507822
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 537
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 33. Probability of Grazing as a Function of Total Income
and Animal Holdings for Whole Sample.
7.3. Probability of Grazing. We ﬁnally consider the relationship between income and a binary
variable for whether or not a household grazes its animals at all. It should be noted that, obviously,
only households that own animals in the ﬁrst place face a choice in this matter. Moreover, it turns
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Figure 15. Probability of Grazing as a Function of Animal Holdings for Whole Sample.
Permanent Income Quartiles
Lowest 25% 25–50% 50–75% Top 25%
%G r a z i n g 72 87 89 79
Days Spent Grazing 29 41 46 38
Table 34. Percentage of Households Grazing Animals and Time Spent Grazing
by Income Quartiles for Whole Sample.
all (i.e., to rely entirely on stall-feeding). The binary variable therefore in eﬀect mostly captures
whether or not a household owns any animals at all.
The ﬁrst regression in Table 33 reports the results of a Probit regression of this binary variable
on income and income squared. As shown in Figure 14, the estimated coeﬃcients on both imply an
inversely U-shaped relationship between the probability of grazing and income. This is consistent
also with the simple tabulation reported in Table 34.
The second regression in Table 33 adds animal holdings and an interaction term between animal
holdings and grass biomass. Income once again becomes insigniﬁcant, suggesting again that it
35merely serves as a proxy for animal holdings in the ﬁrst regression. This in turn implies, however,
that underlying the sharp decline in the probability of grazing at high income levels must be a
similarly sharp drop in animal holdings, although other factors (not included in the regressions)
may also come into play.
7.4. Diﬀerence between Rich Grazers and Non-Grazers. Just as Tables 24 through 30 com-
pared rich collecting and non-collecting households along various dimensions, Tables 35 through 38
do so for rich grazing and non-grazing households. Out 134 households in the top income quartile,
106 graze their animals and 28 do not.
As was true of rich non-collecting households compared to collecting ones, rich non-grazing house-
holds are richer than grazing ones (Table 35), again due mainly to higher incomes from high-skill
labor activities—especially enterprise, but also income from private and public jobs (Table 38)—
and higher transfer incomes. The diﬀerence in total income is much less stark, however, in part
because—as expected—rich non-grazing households own signiﬁcantly less livestock (Table 36) and
earn correspondingly less livestock income. The same fact explains also why they demand signiﬁ-
cantly less fodder from all sources (Table 37). More surprising is that non-grazing households also
own signiﬁcantly less land and earn correspondingly less agricultural income. Lastly, as with the
non-collecting rich, the non-grazing rich tend to be more educated and to have smaller families (see
Table 38).
Overall, therefore, non-grazing households appear to have less surplus labor, and prefer to allo-
cate their time to activities that have higher returns compared to not just the activity of grazing
livestock, but also to agricultural activities as a whole.
Income (Rs.) No Grazing Grazing
Income from Agriculture 4,056 9,224∗∗∗
Income from Livestock 30 229∗∗∗
Income from Resources 833 1,212
Income from Enterprise 3,988 340∗
Income from Labor 5,625 4,241
Income from Financial Transactions 388 -179
Income from Transfers 3,659 604∗
Total Income 18,579 15,670
Table 35. Income Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Graze Animals.
Rich non-grazing households own a lot fewer animals (see Table 36) and obtain fodder from either
their own lands or from the market. That is, these households neither graze nor collect fodder from
common grazing lands (see Table 37). Their having smaller families suggests that these households
choose not to get involved in labor-intensive activities such as livestock rearing.
36Asset Value (Rs.) No Grazing Grazing
Value of Land Owned 27,585 69,052∗∗
Value of Farm Capital Owned 3,888 10,157∗∗
Value of Animals Owned 714 4,249∗∗∗
Table 36. Asset Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Graze Animals.
No Grazing Grazing
Collection from Commons 0 700∗∗∗
Collection from Private Sources 518 2,609∗∗∗
Market Purchase 237 887∗∗∗
Days Spent Grazing 05 0 ∗∗∗
Table 37. Fodder Consumption Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and
Do Not Graze Animals.
No Grazing Grazing
Income from In-Village Casual Labor 878 168
Income from Oﬀ-Village Casual Labor 739 1,490
Income from Private and Public Jobs 4,008 2,582
Whether Head Attended School 0.57 0.63
Years of Schooling 10.8 7.4∗∗∗
Adult Equivalent Units 3.6 5.8∗∗∗
Table 38. Labor Income and Schooling Characteristics of Rich Households that
Do and Do Not Graze Animals.
8. Conclusions
With the goal of better understanding the relationship between poverty and the common-pool
stocks of natural assets, this paper investigates the extent to which rural households depend on
common-pool natural resources for their daily livelihood. Previous studies have found that resource
dependence—deﬁned as the fraction of total income derived from common-pool resources—strongly
decreases with income. Our study ﬁnds a more complex relationship.
First, for the subsample of households using positive amounts of resources, we ﬁnd that depen-
dence follows a U-shaped relationship with income, declining at ﬁrst but then increasing. (Rela-
tively) rich households collect much more construction wood than poor households and collect much
more fodder, even on a per-animal basis. This is true, despite the higher land holdings of the rich;
provision of these resources from private land is for most households evidently not an important
substitute for provision from the commons. In fact, in the case of livestock, private assets act as a
complement instead.
37
37Largely due to diﬃculties with pricing water, we have been unable to consider how dependence on water changes
with household incomes. Given that one of the main uses for water is irrigation, however, we would expect land to
act as a complement to common water resources, which would tend to increase the overall resource dependence of
the rich.
37Second, we ﬁnd that the probability of being in the subsample of common-pool resource users
follows an inverse U-shaped relationship with income: the poorest and richest households are
less likely to collect resources than those with intermediate incomes. Resource use by the rich
is therefore bimodal: either very high or zero. Comparing households in either group, we ﬁnd
that households with zero use tend to be the very richest ones. Moreover, consistent with Jodha’s
(1996) suggestions as to what factors might inﬂuence resource dependence—availability of surplus
labor, access to higher-return activities, and access to substitute private assets—rich non-collecting
households are found to have relatively smaller families, higher education, more income from public-
and private-sector jobs, and higher provision of resources from private land holdings.
Third, we ﬁnd that resource dependence increases at all income levels with an increase in the
level of common-pool biomass availability.
Taken together, these results suggests that the quality of natural resources matters to a larger
share of the rural population than had been previously believed; common-pool resources contribute
a signiﬁcant fraction of the income not just of the desperately poor, but also of the relatively rich.
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